top of page
Search

British Foreign Policy Must-Reads: March

  • Writer: Tim Oliver
    Tim Oliver
  • Apr 6
  • 12 min read


Reports

  • UK-EU defence cooperation—CER: How the UK and the EU can deepen defence co-operation. The UK and the EU face enormous common security and defence challenges. The threat from Russia’s revisionism, combined with Trump’s threats, means that Europeans urgently need to strengthen their defences. Yet, EU-UK co-operation in defence is underdeveloped – in fact the UK’s relationship to the EU in defence is currently more shallow than that of other major non-EU NATO allies like Norway or the US. 

  • UK-EU-Switzerland: CER: The new EU-Swiss deal: What it means and the lessons it holds for the UK-EU 'reset’. The recent political agreement between the European Commission and the Swiss government promises to stabilise their long-troubled economic relationship. The British government should pay close attention.

  • UK’s global standing—House of Lords Library: UK global position: Defence, international partnerships and influence. The global landscape has changed significantly over the last couple of decades. This has led to questions about the UK’s current global standing and its ambitions. This briefing considers these issues in the context of the UK’s membership of international organisations, and its defence policy, foreign policy, and influence through soft power, the economy and aid spending.

  • Indo-Pacific—House of Commons Library: The UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific and what’s next for its policy to the region? This briefing looks at UK's 'tilt to the Indo-Pacific', as first set out in the 2021 Integrated Review under the Conservative government. The goals the tilt achieved in deepening the UK's defence, foreign policy and trade relationships in the region, and what the Labour government has said about the tilt.


Books, Chapters, and Journal Articles

  • Public opinion and Europe—Stuart Smedley: British Public Opinion and Party Policy Towards European Integration, 1973–2016. This book provides the first detailed historical account of British public opinion and party policy towards European integration from 1973 (the year in which the UK joined the European Community) to 2016 (the year in which the UK voted to leave the European Union). It takes a thematic approach towards this subject, exploring party policy and public opinion towards significant developments in the European integration process during the period covered. These include moves towards deeper and flexible integration, economic and monetary union, the Single Market, enlargement, and foreign and defence policy cooperation. The author assesses the nature of British public opinion towards these developments - some of which Britain's government and main political parties supported, and others which they opposed - and analyses the extent to which party policies reflected public opinion.

  • UK views of the EU—The UK's Official EU Narrative: A Trilogy in More Than Three Parts’ in Hussein Kassim, Adriaan Schout, National Government Narratives of the EU: 'Official Stories’ of Belonging. Tracing the ‘career’ of the official story told by UK governments since 1945, this chapter finds that the UK’s official European narrative has been more changeable than is often suggested by the existing literature. Its course, moreover defies the terms of a simple trilogy, reflecting the eras of pre-membership, membership, and post-membership. Drawing on the work of Michael Moran, this chapter contends that, although the UK’s EU narrative has undergone frequent, often dramatic changes, and that successive governments have held out different conceptions of the UK as nation and state, the assumption of greatness has been a constant. It argues that narrative changes have largely been driven by an adversarial party system, which in the absence of a transformative moment of national trauma in the form of occupation, war defeat, or liberation, has perpetuated a more transactional narrative than elsewhere in Europe.

  • Ukraine and Labour—Miles, J. (2025). Reframing internationalism and patriotism: The Labour Party and the Ukraine–Russia war. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. The Labour Party’s response to the Ukraine-Russia war offers some important insights into its internationalism and patriotism. Both aspects experienced considerable strain during Corbyn’s leadership, with the Party perceived as weak on international affairs and unpatriotic. The Starmer leadership, first in opposition and now in government, has drawn on earlier notions and previous leaders and luminaries, emphasising a more traditional view of British patriotism and Britain’s world role. In the speeches, briefings and outputs of leading Party figures such Starmer, Lammy and Healey, the Party has emphasised its ‘ironclad’ support for Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and resisting Russian aggression. As such, the conflict has opened up possibilities to return to earlier understandings of internationalism and patriotism, stressing that Britain will be secure at home and comfortable playing a leading role in Europe and, more widely, on the global stage.

  • Europe and the Conservatives—Bonnet, A.-P. (2025). Communicating the Elephant in the Room: The Evolution of British Conservative Leaders’ ‘Strategic Narratives’ About Europe in Their Annual Conference Speeches (2006–2023). Political Studies. This paper discusses the evolving discursive construction of Europe in the annual conference speeches of British Conservative leaders, from David Cameron’s transformative tenure, after a long spell in the wilderness and years of in-fighting – particularly over Europe – to the more recent keynote address by Rishi Sunak, on the eve of a crucial general election in which the question of migrants coming from Europe was given prominence. It is argued that the discursive image created by Tory leaders’ so-called ‘strategic narratives’ about Europe can shed light on the way they envisage the place, role and identity of the United Kingdom in today’s world. After exploring the way strategic narratives can inform our understanding of international relations and political communication, the article goes on to analyse critically how such narratives have partially shaped the way recent Prime Ministers have framed their connection – or lack thereof – with their closest neighbours.

  • Brexit and reordering the EU—Lovato, M. (2025). From the Core to the Periphery of EU Foreign Policy: Brexit as a Case of Internal Re-Bordering of the EU. Geopolitics, 1–29. The paper investigates the effects of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) on cooperation dynamics among the remaining member states. To do so, it draws on critical border studies and the scholarship on voluntary withdrawals from International Organizations (IOs). The study conceptualises coalition-building and cooperation dynamics as inclusionary/exclusionary bordering practices, which help draw social boundaries between an intangible core and periphery within an IO. Focusing on EU foreign and security policy, I explore how the UK’s departure (re)shaped cooperation dynamics among the remaining members (internal re-bordering of the EU) and how, in turn, it pushed the UK away from the core to the periphery of the EU’s foreign policy cooperation networks. I examine how member states’ cooperation ties within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) – a pivotal EU preparatory committee of the Foreign Affairs Council – changed before and after the Brexit referendum. Descriptive social network analysis is complemented with qualitative evidence from two EU foreign policy negotiations, the 2014 debate on the Russian sanctions and the 2017 negotiations on Permanent Structured Cooperation. As the paper shows, Brexit did not fundamentally alter the structure of EU foreign policy cooperation networks. However, London’s influence over EU foreign policy had been diminishing well before the referendum and the UK’s loss of relative weight continued as it negotiated its exit agreement. At the same time, other member states have since stepped up to fill the UK’s shoes, either by performing similar roles (e.g. moderating differences between France and Germany) or advocating similar positions. The paper shows that while the structure of an IO might be resilient to the peripheralization of a (soon-to-be former) member state, internal bordering practices among the remaining countries do change as a result.

  • Regional spending—Ward, A., Tilley, J., & Hobolt, S. B. (2025). Why regional spending does not affect support for the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 1–25. It is usually assumed that spending by the European Union translates into greater support for the EU among those who benefit from that spending. Empirical work has, however, produced mixed findings as to the association between the EU’s regional development spending and EU support. To better test this relationship, we link a unique dataset on EU spending in Wales at a hyper-local level to survey panel data that measures EU support at, and in the years following, the Brexit referendum. Using this novel data, we find no evidence of an association between spending and various measures of EU support. We demonstrate that this is, at least partially, due to the fact that very few people know of spending in their local area, and that this knowledge is itself only weakly related to amounts of spending. We further show that views of spending are largely driven by perceptual biases rather than actual spending. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the drivers of EU support, but also the effect of public spending on attitudes more generally.

  • BFPG: Why a multilateral defence and security bank? In the few weeks since President Trump upended United States’ policy on Ukraine, European nations including the UK have been forced to reassess at speed the foundations of their own security. Two strategic imperatives – to persuade the United States to remain engaged in Europe, while preparing for the eventuality that it doesn’t – both point firmly towards the need to fund substantial new defence security and resilience capabilities quickly, in many cases from a disturbingly low base. This will cost big money – somewhere between €500 -800bn – that European countries seem to be unwilling or unable to take from domestic priorities and will not be able to borrow on the markets in conventional ways. Only with an innovative approach could Europeans hope to fill the gap. Last week Foreign Secretary David Lammy expressed his support for a multilateral defence and security bank that would provide additional borrowing capacity to governments to fund security and defence needs. While the precise structure is yet to be agreed, the UK’s role in such a bank, alongside EU and other non-EU member states on the one hand fits well with the current UK Government’s wish to ‘reset’ the relationship with Brussels, while at the same time reflecting London’s unique role in Europe in defence, security and finance.

  • Progressive realism—International Affairs: Jason Ralph, Jamie Gaskarth, A Pragmatist critique of progressive realism in foreign policy, International Affairs, Volume 101, Issue 2, March 2025, Pages 623–641. How might pragmatism inform foreign policy? In the United Kingdom's policy sphere, pragmatism is often conflated with realism to mean either a philosophical acceptance of the way the world is, or a prudential awareness that progressive change is difficult but still possible. David Lammy's advocacy of ‘progressive realism’ as a foreign policy ethos seems to favour the latter; yet, we see two problems with Lammy's formulation for progressive foreign policy. First, shackling pragmatism to realism could result in progressive opportunities being missed. Second, as a means towards (or a check on) progressive ends, realist pragmatism risks assuming the undemocratic position that those ends are given (by western powers) and beyond (multilateral) dialogue. We argue that a policy informed by philosophical Pragmatism avoids these risks because unlike realists (and International Relations realists) these Pragmatists are more aware of the constructed and processual (rather than essential and fixed) nature of social problems. In that awareness they will be: 1) less sceptical and more creative in the pursuit of progress; 2) less inclined to compromise on multilateral practices; and 3) more committed to the democratization of those practices as a method of uncovering and solving practical problems. We apply this three-part definition of ‘progressive Pragmatism’ to two hard cases confronting UK foreign policy: the challenge of global governance in a multipolar system and Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Lammy claims his realism is not ‘cynical’. We argue he can better protect progressivism against realist cynicism if he pairs it with Pragmatism.

  • Chinese views of UK—Zhang, B., Xu, R. Chinese views of ‘Global Britain’: evidence from the government, media, and scholars. Asia Eur J 23, 99–116 (2025). Under the slogan ‘Global Britain’, the UK has pursued a range of foreign policy roles. While existing studies focus on the UK’s self-conception of these roles—including a faithful (US) ally, a force for good, a European partner, a Commonwealth leader, a great power, and a global trading state—few have examined other countries’ perceptions in detail. This article examines reactions to these roles of the Chinese government, media, and scholars by drawing on role theory. It reveals two key findings. First, the Chinese government completely rejects the UK’s roles as a faithful ally and a force for good, overlooks the roles of a Commonwealth leader and a European partner, and supports its roles as a global trading state and a great power. Second, while Chinese media and scholars share the government’s rejection of the faithful ally and force for good roles, they somewhat disagree with the government over the rest of these roles. These findings, which highlight the complexity of Chinese role expectations, contribute to studies of British foreign policy, role theory, and China-UK relations.

  • Soft power—Woodward, R. Sport, soft disempowerment and the 1966 FIFA World Cup. British Politics. Sport is increasingly acknowledged as a vital component of the United Kingdom’s arsenal of soft power assets. However, the UK’s attempts to wring soft power from sport have met with mixed success. Many of the UK’s experiences align with an embryonic literature suggesting that sport, as well as enabling the production of soft power, is simultaneously capable of eroding it, a phenomenon dubbed ‘soft disempowerment’. Drawing upon original archival documents, this article examines how the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) commandeered the 1966 World Cup and England’s victory in the competition in a doomed attempt to communicate positive messages about the UK to foreign audiences. Instead a proliferation of alternative narrations of the event by opposing actors ultimately resulted in disempowerment. The case of 1966 also reveals previously overlooked sources of disempowerment, particularly the paradox of credibility. This arises when governments, to enhance the credibility of their messaging, delegate responsibilities to independent actors and institutions—only for these entities to undermine that credibility through actions that spark controversy or cause offence.

  • Trade policy—United kingdom trade diplomacy: Lessons from the (re)establishment of an independent trade policy, in Woolcock, S. (Ed.). (2025). The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations (5th ed.). Routledge. This chapter looks at the development of an independent UK trade policy and capability after the decision to leave the EU in the referendum of 2016. How did the UK adapt to its new status outside the EU Common Commercial Policy? What were the main challenges and how successful has the UK been in overcoming them? Of course this is an unfolding story. I shall focus on the period up to 2021, with which I am most familiar. Rather than a narrative, I shall look at the factors which are necessary, I would suggest, for the success of any trade policy and explain the UK approach and consider its strengths and weaknesses

  • The Commonwealth—Robbins, J. (2025). The Labour government and the modern Commonwealth. The Round Table, 114(1), 115–118.


Comment and news pieces


UK-France, UK-EU relations and nuclear weapons


USA


East of Suez


Military Matters


Trade

  • Trade and Brexit 1---- Policy Exchange: Less than Meets the Eye. The Real Impact of Brexit on UK Trade. This new report by Policy Exchange sets out how the models of the impact of Brexit on UK exports used by the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) are greatly exaggerated – and that the real impact is only a small fraction of what has been assumed.

  • Trade and Brexit 2—UKICE: Policy Exchange’s partial analysis of the impact of Brexit on trade. John Springford examines Phil Radford’s new Policy Exchange report and argues against his analysis of Brexit’s impact on goods exports.

  • Development or defence—FT: Aid’s grim counter-revolution will prove self-defeating. Arguments for slashing overseas development assistance in favour of defence fail on their own terms


 
 
 

Comments

©2018 by Tim Oliver with Wix.com

bottom of page